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contribution to the heterodox canon as well as a notable early strand of his 
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are imagined and can be stated in a way that, potentially at least, allows 
them to be the subject of probability judgments. This focus results in a 
relative neglect of the kind of uncertainties that flow from the existence of 
possibilities that do not even enter the imagination and which are therefore 
ruled out as the subject of probability judgments. This paper explores 
uncertainties of the latter kind, starting with and building on Donald 
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unknowns. Various connections are developed, first with Nassim Taleb’s 
Black Swan, and then with Lawson’s Keynes-inspired interpretation of 
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1. Introduction 
Over the course of the second half of the 1980s Tony Lawson published a series of 
papers on probability and uncertainty (Lawson 1985, 1987, 1988). Written against the 
backdrop of the rational expectations revolution in macroeconomics, and drawing 
heavily on the writings of J.M. Keynes’s (1921, 1936, 1937) and research then being 
conducted in Cambridge on the connections between Keynes’s earlier work on 
probability and his later work in economics (subsequently published as Carabelli, 
1988; Meeks, 2003 and O’Donnell, 1989), one of their principal aims was to restore 
and provide philosophical foundations for a conception of uncertainty not reducible to 
numerically definite probabilities. The papers were widely cited and went on to 
become part of the canon of heterodox approaches in economics that emphasize the 
distinction between situations of risk, in which numerical probabilities can be 
determined, and situations of uncertainty, in which they cannot.  
Influential as these papers were, there is an important form of uncertainty that 
they did not directly examine, namely that which arises in the face of eventualities that 
are not even imagined as possibilities before being revealed. Although an old and 
familiar part of the human condition, uncertainty of this kind has recently been 
attracting attention in the wake of a slew of financial crises, industrial accidents, 
technological shifts and political developments that, while anticipated as possibilities 
by a few, were apparently unforeseen by most before they occurred. Two ideas are 
currently enjoying considerable currency in this connection, so much so that they have 
entered the popular lexicon. The first is the distinction between known unknowns and 
unknown unknowns, already familiar in engineering circles in the 1950s (Wideman, 
1992), but which became famous following its use by the then US Secretary of 
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Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, during a Pentagon news briefing in February 2002 (and 
also subsequently, for example Rumsfeld (2002b, 2011)):  
Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to 
me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we 
know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say 
we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also 
unknown unknowns − the ones we don't know we don't know (Rumsfeld, 
2002a). 
The second is the Black Swan, popularized by Nassim Taleb’s (2007) best-selling 
book of the same name. Black Swan is Taleb’s term for an event characterized by 
three attributes: 
First, it is an outlier, as it lies outside of the realm of regular expectations, 
because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility. 
Second, it carries an extreme impact (unlike the bird). Third, in spite of its 
outlier status, human nature makes us concoct explanations for its 
occurrence after the fact, making it explainable and predictable (Taleb, 
2007, pp. xvii–xviii). 
 Both Rumsfeld and Taleb have their critics, not least Rumsfeld whose remarks 
won the Plain English Campaign’s “Foot in Mouth” award in 2003 for the most 
baffling remark made by a public figure. But there is little doubt that they are onto 
something, and a good deal has now been written on known and unknown unknowns 
and Black Swans, both individually and in tandem, across disciplines including 
economics and finance (Barberis, 2013), operations management and management 
science (Pich, Loch & De Meyer, 2002), probability and statistics (Chichilnisky, 
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2010), decision theory (de Palma et al., 2014), applied psychology (Feduzi & Runde, 
2014), security studies (Mitzen & Schweller, 2011), ecology and environmental 
studies (Wintle, Runge & Bekessy, 2010), political science (Blyth, 2010) and 
sociology (Beck, 2006). There are also many contributions that explore similar ideas 
under different headings such as unforeseen contingencies (Kreps, 1992), unawareness 
(Modica & Rustichini, 1994) and unknowledge (Shackle, 1979, 1983) in economics, 
the small worlds problem in decision theory (Binmore, 2009; Savage, 1954), state 
space uncertainty in philosophy (Bradley & Drechsler, 2014), post decision surprises 
and bolts from the blue in management and organization theory (March, 1994; Weick 
& Sutcliffe, 2007), and Knightian uncertainty or ignorance in entrepreneurship 
(Kirzner, 1979; Sull, 2004). 
Our aim in the present paper is to explore uncertainty of the kind featured in 
this literature, and then to investigate how this may relate to Tony Lawson’s Keynes-
inspired writings on uncertainty. The first part of this project involves a certain amount 
of conceptual groundwork, beginning with a systematization of Rumsfeld’s categories, 
which we subsequently build on to arrive at a formulation of what we call an 
individual’s subjective space of possibilities. We then use this framework in two ways, 
first, to comment on the relationship between Rumsfeld’s unknowns and Taleb’s 
Black Swan, and second, to examine how these ideas fit with those in Lawson’s work 
on probability and uncertainty.
1
 
                                                 
1
 The interpretation of Rumsfeld’s categories explored in the current paper differs from that which 
appears in Feduzi & Runde (2014) and Runde (2009, p. 495). While the underlying intuitions and 
ontologies largely coincide, the points of departure and labels differ. In particular, while the term 
unknowns is used as a synonym for gaps in knowledge in the present paper, it is associated with 
possible eventualities (which may or may not be known) in the earlier contributions.  
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2. Rumsfeld’s categories 
To understand what Rumsfeld has in mind with the distinction between known 
unknowns and unknown unknowns it is helpful to begin with the more fundamental 
distinction he draws between knowns and unknowns. According to Rumsfeld knowns 
are those “things…we know”, while unknowns are those “things we do not know” 
(Rumsfeld, 2002a) or, equivalently, “gaps in our knowledge” (Rumsfeld, 2011, xiv).  
The basic idea here—that at any point in time there are some things that are 
known and some things that are not known to an individual—is unobjectionable.2 Yet 
beyond giving examples of the kinds of things that may be knowns or unknowns, such 
as the role of gravity in making objects fall or the extent of a country’s nuclear 
weapons program (Rumsfeld, 2011, xiv), Rumsfeld provides little in the way of 
further elaboration of these two categories. In particular, he sidesteps difficult 
philosophical questions regarding the nature of knowledge, details that need 
addressing to flesh out the meaning of knowns and unknowns. 
Rumsfeld’s examples indicate that when he talks of a person knowing or not 
knowing something it is generally factive knowledge, particularly descriptive or 
propositional knowledge, that he has in mind. Such knowledge concerns what we will 
call features of the world, by which we mean facts about past, present and future 
reality, including the existence, properties and so forth of any (kind of) entity (ranging 
from animate and inanimate objects, to ideas, theories, opinions and the like), event or 
state of affairs. Examples of things that may be knowns or unknowns to an individual 
                                                 
2
 We restrict our analysis in the present paper to the individual, rather than also considering how these 
terms might be used in relation to the knowledge that a group or community might be said to possess. In 
his own use of these terms it is not clear whether Rumsfeld also has such shared knowledge in mind, 
although some of his examples certainly lend themselves to this reading, as when he discusses what the 
intelligence community may or may not know.  
 6 
thus range from quite broad or abstract features of the world such as the regulations 
that currently govern company mergers within a particular jurisdiction, the extent of 
Iran’s existing nuclear weapons program or the state of academic Economics in thirty 
years’ time, to much more specific features such as the closing level of the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average (DJIA) on January 10 2017, the existence of a group of individuals 
intending to hijack commercial airliners and employ them as weapons or the winner of 
the next FIFA World Cup. 
 Perhaps the most difficult issue Rumsfeld leaves unexamined is what it means 
for an individual to possess knowledge of this kind. On the standard view in 
Epistemology an individual is deemed to have such knowledge if they possess beliefs 
about some feature of the world and where those beliefs are both true and justified. We 
will accept this account for the purposes of what follows, subject to a few 
qualifications.
3
   
Truth is relevant in the present context since beliefs that are plainly false 
cannot constitute knowledge of some feature of the world. But this does beg the 
question of just how accurate an individual’s beliefs must be to count as knowledge. 
Evidently our beliefs rarely correspond to the world in a simple one-to-one way, and 
are often significantly affected by our individual attitudes, interests and ways of seeing 
things. And even where they are accurate in some respects, they are usually partial and 
often fragmentary. There is no easy way around these complications. If we set the 
standard for what counts as knowledge too high, we exclude many of the beliefs that 
serve us well in our decision making. If we set the standard too low we run the risk of 
                                                 
3
 The Gettier problem (Gettier, 1963) provides the most prominent challenge to the idea that true and 
justified belief is sufficient for knowledge. We will ignore these complications and assume that truth 
and justification are both necessary and sufficient.  
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including beliefs that verge on the plain false.  
Justification is relevant in this context because truth alone is insufficient for 
beliefs to be considered knowledge. In addition, to rule out beliefs that, while true, are 
the product of invalid reasoning or based on false evidence, we also require them to be 
based on sound reasoning and reliable evidence. But a problem similar to the one 
raised in the preceding paragraph arises here too: just how well justified do our beliefs 
have to be to count as knowledge? On the one hand, if we restrict knowledge to only 
those true beliefs arrived at on the basis of flawless reasoning and watertight evidence, 
we are again likely to exclude from counting as knowledge many of the beliefs that 
serve us well. On the other hand, with true beliefs generated on the basis of limited 
evidence or little reasoning beyond guesswork, we risk including beliefs that are true 
solely by luck.  
In addition to the considerations raised in the preceding two paragraphs, it is 
questionable whether judgments about whether beliefs are sufficiently true and 
justified to count as knowledge can sensibly ever be made in absolute terms, or 
whether such judgments shouldn’t themselves depend on context. For example, while 
for most purposes we might reasonably say that we have knowledge of the time even 
when our watch is running three minutes slow, our beliefs about the time may not 
qualify as knowledge if we were estimating how long we have to escape a time bomb 
that is about to explode. Similarly, in a situation that requires immediate action the 
standard of justification by which one judges a true belief to be sufficiently justified to 
constitute knowledge may well be lower than in a situation where there is the time for 
a more considered decision. 
 In light of these three considerations, then, for the purposes of what follows we 
will regard beliefs as knowledge when they are approximately true and reasonably 
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well justified relative to the context in which they play a part. On this basis we can 
then define a known as any feature of the world that an individual has knowledge of in 
this sense, and an unknown as any feature of the world that an individual lacks 
knowledge of.  
Understood this way, two forms of unknown can usefully be distinguished. In 
some cases, they will be features of the world about which an individual has no beliefs 
whatsoever. In other cases, they will be features about which an individual has beliefs, 
but where these beliefs are false (or only very vaguely accurate) and / or lack adequate 
justification. The first case captures what is perhaps most usually meant by an 
unknown, where the gap in knowledge is characterized by an absence of beliefs 
concerning some feature of the world. In what follows when we refer to an unknown it 
is this kind of gap in knowledge we have in mind. The second type of unknown is 
rather different, since the gap in knowledge in this case is associated with an 
individual possessing beliefs directly concerned with the relevant feature of the world. 
Thus in the case of false beliefs, for example, rather than an absence of beliefs it is the 
presence of a mistakenly held belief—for example that the DJIA closed at 19201.05 
on January 10 2017—that sustains an individual’s gap in knowledge concerning that 
feature of the world.
4
  
We are now in a position to consider the distinction between known unknowns 
and unknown unknowns, which is usually expressed in terms of whether or not an 
individual knows about a particular gap in their knowledge. Thus Rumsfeld defines 
known unknowns as those “gaps we know exist”, while unknown unknowns are those 
“gaps we don’t know exist” (Rumsfeld, 2011, xiv). Once again the basic idea seems 
clear enough: while there may be many features of the world of which an individual is 
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 The true closing value was 19855.53. 
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ignorant, there are likely some (the known unknowns) that she knows she is ignorant 
of while there are others (the unknown unknowns) that she does not even know she 
does not know.  
There is, however, an important ambiguity here, since at times Rumsfeld and 
others appear to regard a known unknown as a gap in knowledge that an individual not 
only knows about but is also consciously aware of at the relevant time (e.g. when 
deliberating over the best course of action, undertaking scenario analysis and so on). 
And from this perspective the definitions above are imprecise, since knowledge of a 
thing in the form of approximately true and reasonably well justified beliefs need not 
imply the presence of that thing in the conscious mind. Our own view is that the key 
distinction to be drawn is indeed concerned with an individual’s present state of 
awareness of their own gaps in knowledge, since this is crucial to whether an 
individual takes into account the things they do not know. We will therefore proceed 
on the basis that a known unknown is a gap in knowledge that an individual knows 
about and is aware of at the relevant time, while an unknown unknown is a gap in 
knowledge that an individual is not aware of at that time, either because they do not 
know about that gap in knowledge or because, despite knowing of it, they are unaware 
of it. 
3. Hypothetical values and the subjective space of possibilities 
While Rumsfeld’s categories provide a useful starting point, additional concepts and 
distinctions are required if we are to get at the kind of uncertainty that is our focus in 
the present paper. To this end we now introduce a range of ideas concerning what we 
call the hypothetical values associated with an unknown. By a hypothetical value we 
mean any value—an outcome, state of affairs, result, quantity and so on—that could 
conceivably be thought to be a candidate for the actual or true value of the unknown 
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under consideration. Thus in relation to an unknown such as the winner of the next 
FIFA World Cup, hypothetical values might include teams such as Brazil, Germany 
and Algeria, while hypothetical values associated with the extent of Iran’s nuclear 
weapons programme would include a range of different stages of development. By the 
set of hypothetical values associated with an unknown we mean the entire collection 
of values that could conceivably be regarded as the true value of that unknown by any 
person within the group or community concerned. Thus while an unknown refers to a 
gap in the knowledge of a particular individual, the set of hypothetical values 
associated with that unknown is defined for the group as a whole.  
Three distinctions can usefully be drawn between the members of the set of 
hypothetical values associated with an unknown at a given point in time. The first is 
between those hypothetical values that are genuinely possible at that time and those 
that are not, where the former are values that could turn out to be the case while the 
latter are values that could not. Two points are worth highlighting about this 
distinction. The first is that whether some hypothetical value is a genuine possibility or 
not is something that depends on the way the world is rather than what is believed to 
be the case. Thus where the unknown concerns the outcome of the next spin of a 
roulette wheel, then whether or not the outcome 00 is a genuine possibility depends on 
the type of roulette being played. If it is American roulette, with pockets numbered 1 
to 36 plus two additional pockets numbered 0 and 00 respectively, then 00 is 
genuinely possible. And this is so irrespective of any individual’s beliefs about the 
type of roulette being played. If European roulette is being played, where the wheel 
has only one additional pocket numbered 0, then 00 is not a genuine possibility, again 
irrespective of beliefs.  
The second point is that where an unknown relates to something that is already 
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determined there can be only one genuinely possible value. Thus where the unknown 
relates to a past event or feature of a currently existing entity there is a definite way 
the world is and therefore only one genuinely possible value the unknown can take. 
The situation is different in the case where the unknown concerns something that is 
not yet determined such as an event which is yet to occur. In the case of the next spin 
of a roulette wheel for example, provided the wheel is fair and the outcome of any spin 
is a matter of pure chance, then there are many genuinely possible values.  
The two remaining distinctions relate to the individual with whom the 
unknown is associated. The second distinction is between those hypothetical values 
that, at the time concerned, that individual has consciously imagined and those she has 
not. To illustrate, consider the case in which the unknown again concerns the next spin 
of a roulette wheel and where, unbeknown to the individual, an American wheel is 
being used. Further, suppose the individual is familiar with European roulette but 
unaware of its American cousin. In this case, provided we are dealing with a known 
unknown, the outcomes 1 to 36, as well as 0, are likely to have been imagined by the 
individual, while the outcome 00 is not. If we are dealing with an unknown unknown, 
however, the situation is different. Being unaware of the gap in knowledge, perhaps 
not even knowing, for example, that a spin of the roulette wheel is about to take place, 
the individual cannot have consciously imagined hypothetical values at all in respect 
of the outcome. The point here holds generally: only in the case of a known unknown 
can an individual have consciously imagined hypothetical values. Where a gap in 
knowledge is an unknown unknown to an individual, being unaware of that gap in 
knowledge at that time, she cannot have contemplated values that might turn out to be 
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the true or actual value.
5
 
The final distinction is between those hypothetical values the individual has 
consciously imagined and regards as possible and those that individual has imagined 
but regards as impossible. By “regards as possible” we mean that, at that time, there is 
nothing the individual can think of that she would regard as an insurmountable barrier 
to the hypothetical value being true or proving to be the case. Returning to our roulette 
example and the case where the outcome is a known unknown, if the individual is 
aware of both American and European variants but believes that a European wheel is 
being used, it is likely she has consciously thought of outcomes 1 to 36, 0 and 00 as 
hypothetical values, but regards the latter as impossible given the nature of the wheel 
being used. 
Taken together these three distinctions imply that, for a particular individual 
and at a given moment in time, all elements of the set of hypothetical values associated 
with an unknown must fall into one of six categories. These categories and the 
relationships between them are depicted in Table 1.  
                                                 
5
 As one of our referees pointed out, things become more complicated if we allow for unknowns that 
result from an individual holding false or unjustified beliefs. Then it is possible that an individual can 
have consciously imagined hypothetical values even in the case of an unknown unknown. To illustrate, 
consider the case of an unknown that results from an individual holding false beliefs. In particular, 
suppose that the unknown concerns the outcome of a football match that took place last night. If the 
individual wrongly believes that the home side won then the outcome of the game is an unknown to that 
individual and, provided the individual is unaware of her mistake, is an unknown unknown. Yet in this 
case the individual is likely, at a minimum, to consciously imagine the home team she (wrongly) 
believes won the game as a hypothetical value. And she may well also consciously imagine, and then 
dismiss, the other two possible results. The point, then, is that unknowns of this kind may be unknown 
unknowns and yet still be the subject of conscious reflection.  
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   Hypothetical value is… 
   a genuine possibility. not a genuine possibility. 
Hypothetical 
value is… 
consciously 
imagined by the 
individual and… 
regarded as 
possible. 
1. Hypothetical values imagined and correctly 
regarded as possible. 
2. Hypothetical values imagined and incorrectly 
regarded as possible. 
regarded as 
impossible. 
3. Hypothetical values imagined and incorrectly 
regarded as impossible. 
4. Hypothetical values imagined and correctly 
regarded as impossible. 
not consciously 
imagined by the 
individual. 
 5. Hypothetical values not imagined. 6. Hypothetical values not imagined. 
Table 1: Classifying the hypothetical values associated with an unknown  
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The six categories depicted in Table 1 provide a framework for describing an 
individual’s awareness, at a particular point in time, of what may turn out to be true in relation 
to some unknown. The first column contains hypothetical values that are genuine possibilities. 
Those in Cell 1 are consciously imagined by the individual and correctly regarded as genuine 
possibilities, while those in Cell 3 are consciously imagined but mistakenly regarded as 
impossibilities. Hypothetical values in Cell 5 are ones that, despite being genuine 
possibilities, are not consciously imagined by the individual at all. The second column 
contains hypothetical values that are not genuine possibilities. Cell 2 contains hypothetical 
values that are imagined by the individual and mistakenly regarded as genuine possibilities, 
while Cell 4 contains hypothetical values that are imagined and rightly regarded as 
impossibilities. Cell 6 contains hypothetical values that the individual has not imagined and 
that are anyway not genuine possibilities. 
For a given unknown, and a given individual, the distribution of hypothetical values 
between the six cells in the table at any point in time depends on two sets of factors. Whether 
a particular hypothetical value occupies a cell located in the first or the second column is 
something that, as we noted earlier, is determined by the nature of the world at that time and 
the constraints this places on which values are genuinely feasible. Within each column the 
distribution of values between rows is then determined by factors specific to the individual 
concerned. The first of these is whether or not the individual is aware of the gap in 
knowledge, in other words whether the unknown is a known unknown or an unknown 
unknown. For as we noted earlier, in the case of an unknown unknown the hypothetical 
values within each column must reside exclusively in the bottom row of the table, in Cell 5 
and Cell 6, since the individual cannot have consciously imagined any hypothetical values. In 
the case of a known unknown, where the individual is aware of the gap in knowledge, the 
determining factors are then the individual’s knowledge of the circumstances relevant to the 
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unknown at that time and their cognitive abilities in relation to reasoning, imagination and so 
forth.  
Considering the hypothetical values in the first column of the table, those that are 
genuine possibilities, in the case of a known unknown for someone with strong cognitive 
abilities and a good understanding of the situation surrounding the unknown, most or all of 
the values will reside in Cell 1, with relatively few or even none residing in Cell 3 and Cell 5. 
An individual with a more limited or mistaken grasp of the situation, or who is less able to 
reason to, or imagine, genuine possibilities, is likely to make more errors, with fewer elements 
in Cell 1 and more therefore in Cell 3 and Cell 5. Returning to the roulette example, if 
American roulette is being played and the individual knows only the European variety, then 
1-36 and 0 would likely be located in cell 1 and 00 in Cell 5. Cell 3 in this case is likely to be 
an empty set. If, however, the individual wrongly believed that 12 could not come up on the 
next spin (it perhaps having come up on the three previous spins), then in this case 12 would 
be located in Cell 3. Similar considerations apply to the distribution of values among the cells 
in the second column, where for someone knowledgeable of the situation and with adequate 
mental powers Cell 2 should be empty, or contain very little, with most or all of the 
hypothetical values residing in either Cell 4 or Cell 6.
6
  
Before moving on it is worth emphasizing that the analysis here, at least as we have 
presented it so far and as summarized in Table 1, provides only a static framework for 
thinking about hypothetical values. That is to say, it characterizes the state of the world (as 
                                                 
6
 In some cases, having a good understanding of the scenario may imply that an individual is likely to 
consciously imagine, and then dismiss, values that are not genuinely possible (Cell 4) rather than not imagining 
them at all (Cell 6). An example of this is an experienced gambler who, playing European roulette, may be 
expected to consciously rule out 00 as a possible outcome rather than not imagine it at all. In general, however, 
for a knowledgeable individual it will be a matter of that individual’s background beliefs as to whether 
something that is impossible is thought of and then dismissed, or simply not considered at all. 
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reflected in the distribution of hypothetical values between the two columns) and a person’s 
thoughts (as reflected in the distribution of hypothetical values between the three rows) at a 
given moment. We will keep to this static analysis for the remainder of the paper. But note 
that it would be possible to incorporate dynamic considerations into this set up, both in the 
form of changes to the world that alter whether particular hypothetical values are genuinely 
possible or not, as well as an individual’s learning in response to new information that alters 
that individual’s beliefs about particular hypothetical values (and perhaps even whether an 
unknown is a known unknown or an unknown unknown to that person). In the former case the 
analysis would consist of showing how hypothetical values move within a row, from one 
column to another, as changes to the world alter whether a given hypothetical value is 
possible or not. In the latter case the corresponding analysis consists of showing how 
hypothetical values move within a column, from one row to another, as a person alters their 
beliefs in response to new information.  
Returning to the static case depicted in Table 1, the hypothetical values located in Cell 
1 and Cell 2, those consciously imagined and regarded as genuine possibilities, are the kind 
dealt with in conventional decision theory and which an individual would list explicitly in the 
framing of a decision problem. We will call this set of values the individual’s subjective space 
of possibilities in respect of an unknown (henceforth SSP). Notice that the SSP in respect of 
an unknown unknown must necessarily be empty, for as we noted earlier if an individual is 
unaware of a gap in knowledge that individual cannot even begin to contemplate candidates 
for its true value. Thus the SSP is of particular relevance to known unknowns, where its 
contents reflect an individual’s thoughts about what might turn out to be the case with respect 
to a gap in knowledge that individual is aware of.  
The contents of the SSP for any particular known unknown will of course always be 
relative to the individual’s cognitive abilities and background beliefs in connection with the 
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relevant unknown. Thus someone with a background in nuclear weaponry and a knowledge of 
conditions in Iran will likely possess a quite different space of possibilities regarding the state 
of that country’s nuclear weapons programme than someone who does not. In relation to the 
kind of uncertainty we are primarily interested in in this paper, namely the coming about of 
things that a person had no conception of prior to their occurrence, we will see in later 
sections that a key issue is the fit between an individual’s views about the possible values an 
unknown might take and the way the world actually is in this regard. In some cases, the SSP 
may coincide perfectly with the objective situation, such that the SSP contains all genuinely 
possible values (i.e. Cell 3 and Cell 5 are empty) and no others (i.e. Cell 2 is empty). Thus 
where the gap in knowledge concerns the outcome of the next spin of a fair roulette wheel, 
and the individual knows that American rather than European roulette is being played, the 
individual’s SSP is likely to be objectively accurate, that is, containing the outcomes 1–36, 0 
and 00, and nothing else.  
Such examples represent something of a special case, however, since roulette and 
games of chance more generally usually feature well-defined, reasonably simple, isolated 
systems, where it is relatively straightforward for an individual to determine to a high degree 
of accuracy what may, and may not, turn out to be the case. Yet for unknowns that arise in 
more practical, real life, scenarios things are often quite different. The complexity of these 
situations will usually be far higher, making it more difficult for individuals to accurately 
determine the set of genuinely possible values. In such cases, the SSP is likely to be deficient 
in some way. There are two possible types of error. The first is that the SSP may omit genuine 
possibilities, either as a result of a hypothetical value having been contemplated but wrongly 
judged impossible or because the individual failed to even imagine that value at all. The 
second source of error is that the SSP may wrongly include hypothetical values that are 
impossibilities, outcomes or states of affairs that cannot actually arise. 
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4. Taleb’s Black Swan 
We now turn to the relationship between Rumsfeld’s categories and the seemingly closely 
related idea of the Black Swan as described by Nassim Taleb. According to Taleb (xvii–xviii), 
a Black Swan is an event distinguished by three properties: 
P1: “It is an outlier, as it lies outside of the realm of regular expectations, because nothing 
in the past can convincingly point to its possibility”; 
P2: “it carries an extreme impact”; and 
P3: “in spite of its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct explanations for its 
occurrence after the fact, making it explainable and predictable.”  
We will focus primarily on P1 in what follows, as it is here that the issues addressed in the 
present paper surface most clearly in Taleb’s account. P2 and P3 concern things that for the 
most part lie beyond our immediate concerns. 
As we have already noted, the property of a Black Swan highlighted in P1 is that it is 
an event that “lies outside the realm of regular expectations” (Taleb, 2007, p. xvii). The same 
kind of idea is expressed towards the end of the book where Taleb writes: “Remember that for 
an event to be a Black Swan, it does not just have to be rare, or just wild; it has to be 
unexpected, has to lie outside our tunnel of possibilities” (Taleb, 2007, p. 213). Unfortunately 
Taleb does not appear to define terms such as “realm of regular expectations” or “tunnel of 
possibilities”, and, evocative as these phrases may be, they are lacking in precision. We will 
accordingly try to add some by formulating what he has to say in terms of our earlier 
framework and the notion of the SSP in particular.  
To do so it is first necessary to say something about the context within which an 
individual’s expectations about the future arise. In terms of our own framework this means 
specifying the relevant unknown, namely the aspect of future events about which the 
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individual is unsure. In some cases this unknown may be quite specific, such as whether a 
company will move into profit over the next quarter or the outcome of the next spin of a 
roulette wheel. In other cases the unknown may be considerably more vague, reflecting 
uncertainty about the course of events in general rather than a particular, well-defined, aspect 
of the world. Whatever its level of generality, the unknown may be known or unknown 
depending on the individual concerned. In the case of someone actively contemplating the 
(relevant aspect of the) future—a financial analyst evaluating a company, for example, or a 
gambler where to place a bet—the gap in knowledge is a known unknown. Alternatively, 
where an individual has not thought about the (relevant aspect of the) future the gap in 
knowledge is an unknown unknown. 
Once the relevant unknown is specified, Taleb’s P1 can then be given more precise 
formulation by relating it to an individual’s SSP. When Taleb writes of events that lie outside 
the “realm of regular expectations” or the “tunnel of possibilities” we will interpret him to 
mean events that, at the time of their occurrence, were not foreseen even as possibilities by 
the individual concerned. Such events then correspond to hypothetical values that, at the point 
in time at which uncertainty resolves and the actual value of the unknown becomes known, lie 
outside the individual’s SSP in relation to that unknown. Table 1 above includes four cells 
whose members fall outside the SSP, namely Cells 3, 4, 5 and 6. From the point of view of 
Taleb’s first property, then, hypothetical values in these four cells represent candidates for 
Black Swans, events whose occurrence would constitute Black Swans provided P2 and P3 are 
also satisfied. For an unknown unknown, of course, all hypothetical values lie outside the 
individual’s SSP and so represent candidates for Black Swans in this sense. In the case of a 
known unknown the distribution of hypothetical values in terms of membership or not of the 
SSP will be determined by the kinds of factors discussed in the preceding section.  
The analysis here can be taken one step further by incorporating the fact that, in virtue 
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of P2 and P3, only events that have actually occurred can be Black Swans on Taleb’s schema, 
since it is only once an event has taken place that it can have an extreme impact and be the 
subject of post hoc rationalisations. It follows that a Black Swan must correspond to a 
hypothetical value that was a genuine possibility. Making this requirement explicit Taleb’s 
first condition for an event to be a Black Swan is then that: 
P1': The corresponding hypothetical value is a genuine possibility and, at the time the 
event occurs, lies outside the SSP in respect of the relevant unknown, either because it 
was not imagined or was wrongly deemed impossible. 
The requirement that the corresponding hypothetical value be a genuine possibility means that 
we can disregard as candidate Black Swans those hypothetical values located in the right-
hand column of Table 1; only those hypothetical values located in Cell 3 and Cell 5 satisfy 
P1'.
 7
  
We summarize this in Table 2, a cut down and re-interpreted version of Table 1, 
which illustrates our formulation of Taleb’s first property by distinguishing three possible 
scenarios in relation to an individual’s expectations concerning an event that has occurred.  
   Event that occurred was ... 
At the time of 
the event’s 
occurrence the 
corresponding 
consciously imagined 
by the individual 
and… 
regarded as 
possible. 
1a. correctly regarded as possible. 
regarded as 
impossible. 
3a. incorrectly regarded as impossible. 
                                                 
7
 One advantage of formulating Taleb’s ideas in terms of our own framework is that doing so makes it clearer 
how, prior to the occurrence of some event, that event might change from being a candidate Black Swan for an 
individual to not being a candidate Black Swan, or vice versa, as a result of the individual acquiring new 
information or simply rethinking the situation. We can capture this in terms of the movement of hypothetical 
values within a column as described in section 3. Thus where the corresponding hypothetical value moves from 
Cell 3 to Cell 1, an event that formerly would have satisfied our formulation of Taleb’s first property no longer 
does so. Similarly, where the corresponding hypothetical value moves from Cell 1 to Cell 3, an event that 
previously would not have satisfied our formulation of Taleb’s first property now does so.  
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hypothetical 
value was ... not consciously 
imagined by the 
individual. 
 5a. not imagined. 
Table 2: Reformulating Taleb’s first property 
Cell 1a corresponds to the case where an individual has correctly imagined the event as a 
possibility. The corresponding hypothetical value was therefore included in the individual’s 
SSP and the event does not satisfy our formulation of Taleb’s first property. Cell 3a and Cell 
5a correspond to the two cases that do satisfy our formulation of Taleb’s first property, events 
that have occurred and that, at the time of their occurrence, their corresponding hypothetical 
values fell outside the SSP. Cell 5a, where the event was not even imagined, is perhaps the 
more straightforward of the two. This case is illustrated by the example in which the (known) 
unknown is the outcome of a game of American roulette being played by someone familiar 
with only the European variety. Accordingly the individual does not even imagine the 
hypothetical value 00 and include it in their SSP. Facing the same (known) unknown Cell 3a 
is illustrated by the case of hypothetical value 00 dismissed as impossible by the roulette 
player who knows the difference between American and European roulette, but who is 
operating under the mistaken assumption that European rather than American roulette is being 
played.
8
   
5. Uncertainty 
In this final part of the paper we explore the relationship between the ideas discussed in the 
preceding sections and the conception of uncertainty advanced by Tony Lawson in a string of 
                                                 
8
 It is interesting that the source of the title of Taleb’s book, the discovery in the late 17th century of the 
existence of black swans in Western Australia by a party led by Dutch explorer William de Vlamingh, falls into 
this second category. For the existence of black swans was up to that point regarded as an impossibility in 
Europe, a source of the simile that can be traced back as far as the Satires of the Roman poet Juvenal writing at 
the turn of the first century (Juvenal, Satire 6). 
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papers published over the course of the 1980s (Lawson, 1985, 1987, 1988). Since Lawson 
never addressed the subject of unimagined possibilities in these papers, we will attempt to 
show how our earlier discussion of unknowns, hypothetical values and the SSP may be used 
to augment his account in this regard.  
 The primary influence on Lawson’s writings on uncertainty is J.M. Keynes, a rich 
source in virtue of the significant contribution Keynes made to the subject of probability in 
his 1921 A Treatise on Probability (Keynes, 1921/1973) and, in some ways perhaps even 
more so, for the glimpses of this work in his later economic writings on uncertainty in his 
General Theory and beyond (Keynes, 1936; 1937). Much of Lawson’s contribution in the 
three papers cited above lies in unpacking and building on Keynes’s ideas on probability—
and also, but to a lesser extent, those of Knight (1921)—which went on to form an important 
plank of his wider critique of, and alternative to, mainstream economics (Lawson, 1997, 
2003).   
 Understanding Lawson on the topic of uncertainty therefore requires going back to A 
Treatise on Probability. This is not an entirely straightforward matter as the conception 
developed there is rather different from the modern view of probability as a branch of 
mathematics and its more familiar frequentist or subjectivist interpretations. What Keynes 
proposes instead is a view of probability as an indicator of the strength of the argument, or 
what he calls the probability-relation, between some conclusion and the evidence bearing on 
it. He formalizes this idea as follows: 
Let our premisses (sic) consist of any set of propositions h, and our conclusions 
consist of any set of propositions, a, then, if a knowledge of h justifies a rational 
belief in a of degree , we say that there is a probability-relation of degree  
between a and h (Keynes 1921/1973, p. 4) 
The probability-relation is written: 
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a/h =       (1) 
where, for example, a might be the proposition “inflation will be 4% next year”, h a body of 
evidential propositions concerning recent changes in the money supply, interest rates, 
aggregate demand and so on relevant to a, and  the rational degree of belief, or probability, 
that h justifies in a. Keynes makes a useful distinction between primary and secondary 
propositions here, where the latter involve assertions about probability-relations while the 
former do not. With respect to (1) above, a is the primary proposition, and the probability 
relation (1) is the secondary proposition. The secondary proposition is thus both a proposition 
in its own right and a statement about the primary proposition. The set of evidential 
propositions, h, may include (other) secondary as well as primary propositions. 
Keynes holds that the value of  in any probability relation ranges between 0, where 
not-a is a logical consequence of h and a is therefore impossible, and 1, where a is a logical 
consequence of h. The intermediate values represent cases in which h only partially entails a. 
An important and, from a modern point of view rather idiosyncratic feature, of Keynes’s 
theory is his insistence that the rational degrees of belief represented by  are generally not 
numerically definite, nor necessarily even pair-wise comparable in terms of more than, less 
than, or equal to (Keynes, 1921/1973, p. 37).  
To flesh out this scheme it is helpful to consider Keynes’s views on knowledge and 
the cognate categories of certainty and truth. Knowledge, for Keynes, corresponds to true and 
certain rational belief, where certainty denotes the highest degree of rational belief in a 
proposition.
9
 He distinguishes between direct and indirect knowledge, reflecting the two ways 
in which he believes knowledge of propositions can be acquired. The first is by “direct 
                                                 
9
 “… knowledge of a proposition always corresponds to certainty of rational belief in it and at the same time to 
actual truth in the proposition itself. We cannot know a proposition unless it is in fact true” (Keynes, 1921/1973, 
p. 11). 
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acquaintance”, whereby “we are able to pass from direct acquaintance with things to a 
knowledge of propositions about the things of which we have sensations or understand the 
meaning” (Keynes, 1921/1973, p. 13). Although alive to the difficulties and possible 
objections involved, he proceeds on the basis that direct acquaintance always leads to certain 
rational belief.
10
 The second route is “indirectly, by argument, through perceiving the 
probability-relation of the proposition, about which we seek knowledge, to other 
propositions” (Keynes, 1921/1973, p. 12), where these other propositions correspond to the 
body of known evidential premises h. 
Returning to (1), Keynes holds that the probability relation is only ever known 
directly, and, when known in conjunction with the body of evidential propositions h, provides 
indirect knowledge about a (when a/h < 1), or of a (when a/h = 1). In the former case this 
knowledge is said to entail a probable degree of rational belief of degree  in the proposition 
a, while the latter case involves certain belief in a.
11
  
Keynes’s theory represents a form of epistemic probability, concerned as it is with 
                                                 
10
 “… I have assumed that all direct knowledge is certain. All knowledge, that is to say, which is obtained in a 
manner strictly direct by contemplation of the objects of acquaintance and without any admixture whatever of 
argument and contemplation of the logical bearing of any other knowledge on this, corresponds to certain 
rational belief and not to a mere probable degree of belief.” (Keynes, 1921/1973, p. 17).    
11
 There is tension between the places in which Keynes describes knowledge as corresponding to true and certain 
belief, and the places in which he talks about indirect knowledge where “knowledge” falls short of certainty. 
Keynes seems to sense something of this problem where he writes: “I assume then that the (sic) only true 
propositions can be known, that the term ‘probable knowledge’ ought to be replaced by the term ‘probable 
degree of rational belief’, and that a probable degree of rational belief cannot arise directly but only as the result 
of an argument, out of the knowledge, that is to say, of a secondary proposition asserting some logical 
probability-relation in which the object of belief stands to some known proposition” (Keynes, 1921/1973, p. 18). 
It is therefore helpful to read Keynes’s references to indirect knowledge as referring to degrees of belief that are 
only probable, save of course for the limit cases in which a/h = 1 or a/h = 0.  
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degrees of belief, and to this extent has affinities with the subjectivist or personalist 
interpretation associated with Ramsey (1931), de Finetti (1937/1964) and Savage (1954). The 
main difference between Keynes and these authors, besides his view that probabilities are 
generally not point valued, is that the degrees of belief he has in mind are not merely 
subjective or personal to the individual concerned, but the degrees of belief it is rational to 
hold in any proposition given the evidence bearing on it. The only subjectivity Keynes admits 
in his scheme is with respect to the contents of h, which he sees as depending on individual 
circumstances. Given h, however, he believes there is only one objective probability-relation 
between a and h. 
Keynes does not define uncertainty in A Treatise on Probability, and one of the aims of 
Lawson’s 1985 paper is to provide an interpretation of uncertainty consistent with the 
framework sketched above. Building on the idea that uncertainty must involve a lack of 
certainty of some kind, Lawson proposes that uncertainty corresponds to the situation in 
which direct knowledge of the secondary proposition is absent (Lawson, 1985, p. 913). 
Uncertainty can then arise in one of two ways: (1) where the relevant probability relation is 
unknown due to an individual’s inability to argue from given evidence to the degree of 
rational belief it justifies in some proposition, and (2) where there exists no method for 
determining a numerical measure of the probability relation, namely where probabilities are 
numerically immeasurable or indeterminate (Lawson, 1985, p. 913).
12
  
On the basis that the first of these, the situation where an individual may simply lack the 
wherewithal to arrive at the true numerical probability, does not seem to feature elsewhere in 
Keynes’s work, Lawson argues for the second interpretation as being most in keeping with 
                                                 
12
 An alternative interpretation of (2), noted but rejected by Keynes primarily on the grounds of maintaining as 
general a notion of probability as possible, is to say that in such circumstances there exists no probability relation 
at all (Keynes, 1921/1973, p. 11).  
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Keynes’s use of the term uncertainty in his economic writings. A difficulty with this 
interpretation, however, is that on Keynes’s own account in A Treatise on Probability, it is 
quite possible to have direct knowledge of the secondary-proposition and for the probable 
degree of belief it justifies nevertheless to be numerically immeasurable or numerically 
indeterminate. For Keynes, in other words, numerically immeasurable or indeterminate 
probabilities are not necessarily a sign of an absence of direct knowledge of the secondary 
proposition.   
This problem is avoided in a later paper in which Lawson returns to the subject of 
Keynesian uncertainty, but this time moves away from associating uncertainty with the 
absence of direct knowledge of the secondary proposition. Instead uncertainty is simply 
equated with numerically immeasurable or indeterminate probability-relations. The crucial 
passage is a long footnote, the first half of which runs as follows:    
In A Treatise on Probability and later in the General Theory, Keynes essentially 
distinguishes three types of probability-relation: the first where a probability-
relation is numerically indeterminate and possibly not even comparable to (in 
terms of less than, equal to, or greater than) other probability relations; the second 
where probabilities are numerically determinate but less than unity (and greater 
than zero); and the third where probabilities take the value of unity (or zero). The 
first type of probability, for Keynes, corresponds to a situation of uncertainty (see 
Lawson, 1985) and the third to a situation of certainty. Moving from the first type 
through the second towards the third, Keynes talks … of the argument in question 
being less 'uncertain' … (Lawson, 1987, p. 953, f. 2) 
The conception of uncertainty captured in this passage is strongly reminiscent of that 
expressed in Knight’s (1921) famous distinction between risk and uncertainty, where the 
former corresponds to situations in which numerically definite probabilities can be 
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determined and the latter to situations in which they cannot. In a slightly later paper in which 
he compares various interpretations of probability and uncertainty, Lawson again comes down 
explicitly in favour of this Keynesian / Knightian view of uncertainty as “corresponding to 
situations wherein numerically measurable probabilistic knowledge is not available” (Lawson, 
1988, p. 62).  
We are now in a position to consider how these ideas fit with our earlier discussion of 
unknowns, hypothetical values and the SSP. The site we use to explore this question is the 
famous passage from Keynes’s 1937 QJE defense of The General Theory, also quoted and 
discussed by Lawson (1985, p. 914), in which, sixteen years after A Treatise on Probability 
was published, Keynes outlines what he means by uncertainty: 
By “uncertain knowledge”, let me explain, I do not mean merely to distinguish 
what is known for certain from what is merely probable. The game of roulette is 
not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty; nor is the prospect of a Victory bond 
being drawn. Or, again, the expectation of life is only moderately uncertain. Even 
the weather is only moderately uncertain. The sense in which I am using the term 
is that in which the prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper 
and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new 
invention, or the position of private wealth-holders in 1970. About these matters 
there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability 
whatsoever. We simply do not know (Keynes, 1937, pp. 213-214). 
While Keynes does not explicitly contrast risk with uncertainty in this passage, his 
message is clearly in keeping with the conception of uncertainty outlined above. Keynes 
illustrates his view with a spectrum of examples aimed at demonstrating the extent to which 
numerically definite probabilities of events or outcomes can be determined in each case. We 
reproduce Keynes’s spectrum diagrammatically in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Keynes’s spectrum of examples 
The examples grouped together on the left, the cases of roulette and a lottery draw, are 
ones in which numerical probabilities can be calculated on an a priori basis by assuming 
equal probabilities of the elementary outcomes. Those grouped in the middle, the expectation 
of life and the weather, are ones in which numerical probabilities can sometimes be 
determined, at least within limits, by way of an empirical estimation of underlying 
frequencies.
13
 The cases grouped together on the right, according to Keynes, are ones in 
which there is no scientific method for the calculation of numerical probabilities. Moving 
between these three groups from left to right across the spectrum, then, we move 
progressively from situations in which numerical probabilities can be determined, situations 
of “risk” (Dequech, 2000; Dow, 2015; Knight, 1921; Lawson, 1988; Meeks, 2003), through to 
                                                 
13
 Knight, like Keynes, distinguishes between a priori probabilities and frequencies when talking about 
numerical probabilities, which he then counterposes against uncertainty (Runde, 1998).    
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situations of “uncertainty” in which they cannot.14   
As well as illustrating Keynes’s notion of uncertainty, the spectrum of examples in 
Figure 1 also provides a useful bridge to the various concepts discussed in earlier parts of the 
present paper. Each of the examples corresponds to an unknown in Rumsfeld’s sense, since 
they all concern gaps in knowledge (in this case pertaining to the future, such as the outcome 
of a lottery, the weather over some period or the price of copper twenty years’ hence). Each of 
these gaps in knowledge have a set of hypothetical values associated with them, with each 
member of each set corresponding to an outcome or state of affairs that could be thought to be 
the actual or true value associated with the unknown under consideration. And the subset of 
each set of hypothetical values that the individual consciously imagines and regards as 
genuinely possible with respect to each unknown corresponds to the SSP of that individual, 
where each member of that subset may be the subject of probability judgments by that 
individual (primary propositions in the language of A Treatise on Probability). Note we will 
assume that we are dealing with known unknowns in each case here, since otherwise the SSP 
would simply be empty. Returning to our earlier example of the proposition that inflation will 
be 4% next year, this proposition is one hypothetical value associated with the known 
unknown that is next year’s inflation rate. This proposition will be subject to uncertainty in 
Keynes’s sense, insofar as it does not have a numerically measurable probability. 
                                                 
14
 Proponents of the subjectivist Bayesian interpretation of probability have argued that, if subjective degrees of 
belief are “rational” in the sense of conforming to the strictures of something like the Savage axioms (Savage 
1954), all probabilities become numerical and the distinction between risk and uncertainty evaporates (Leroy and 
Singell, 1987). However, there is considerable empirical evidence that people often do not behave “as if” they 
are assigning numerically definite probabilities to the things they are uncertain about even in relatively 
straightforward situations (Ellsberg, 1961), and a large amount of theoretical work, much of it by people 
working within the subjectivist Bayesian tradition, aimed at modelling these cases (e.g. Bewley, 1986; 
Gärdenfors and Sahlin, 1988).  
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One of the advantages of locating Keynes’s and Lawson’s ideas within our earlier 
framework in this way is that it brings into focus aspects of uncertainty—here understood in 
its generic sense as referring to an absence of certainty of some kind—relatively neglected in 
their accounts. The remainder of this section is devoted to one of these aspects, what we will 
call unimagined possibilities. What we have in mind here are the kinds of outcomes or 
eventualities we mentioned at the start of the paper: industrial accidents, terrorist actions, 
scientific discoveries, political developments and the like that many people seem not to have 
entertained even as possibilities prior to their occurrence.  
Unimagined possibilities of this sort are hypothetical values, associated with an 
unknown, that while being genuine possibilities have not been consciously imagined as such 
by the individual concerned. They therefore correspond to the hypothetical values located in 
Cell 5 of our earlier Table 1. It could be argued that hypothetical values in Cell 3, those that 
have been contemplated but wrongly deemed impossible, should also be considered 
unimagined possibilities since they too concern things the individual has not imagined as 
actually occurring. While the existence of such values may be significant, as a potential 
source of Black Swans for example, we will exclude them from the present analysis to focus 
on those genuine possibilities that have not entered the individual’s conscious mind at all.  
We touched on the notion of unimagined possibilities earlier in the paper, in relation 
to the question of how closely an individual’s SSP is likely to match objective reality. More 
specifically, we noted that the SSP may be deficient in two ways: first, it may omit values that 
are genuine possibilities, and second, it may include values that are not genuine possibilities. 
Unimagined possibilities are one source of the first kind of error, where an individual has 
failed to come up with a value that the unknown might actually take. Values that have been 
imagined but rejected as impossible—those in Cell 3—represent a second source of this first 
kind of error. The extent to which the SSP exhibits a close fit with objective reality, and so 
 31 
avoids such errors, depends jointly on the nature of the unknown and the cognitive abilities 
and background knowledge of the individual concerned. And it was in this context we argued 
that unknowns associated with games of chance represent something of a special case, for 
unlike many of the unknowns that arise in life, such games typically involve well-defined, 
relatively simple, closed systems in respect of which it is comparatively straightforward to 
determine the set of genuinely possible outcomes.  
From this perspective it is significant that most of the examples Keynes refers to in the 
earlier QJE passage are similar to games of chance in terms of the limited scope for 
unimagined possibilities. To see this, and remembering that it is known unknowns we are 
dealing with here, consider what the SSP is likely to look like for a typical individual in each 
of the examples in Figure 1.
15
 In the cases of roulette and the drawing of a Victory bond we 
are in the realm of games of chance of the sort just described and for which the set of 
genuinely possible hypothetical values is typically known from the outset or else easily 
determined. In these cases, we would expect the SSP to comprise only, and all, the genuinely 
possible outcomes of the spin or draw and for there to be no unimagined possibilities.  
In cases in which the unknown concerns the value of a single variable—the price of 
copper or the interest rate in twenty years’ time, and even the expectation of life—the set of 
genuinely possible hypothetical values is restricted to a range on the real line. Here again, 
then, we would expect the SSP to match closely the set of genuinely possible values, where 
the only way in which the latter might fall outside the SSP is where an individual sets the 
upper or lower bounds of the range too conservatively. In such a scenario, however, the 
genuinely possible values omitted from the SSP are unlikely to constitute unimagined 
                                                 
15
 By a typical individual here we mean someone with an average level of cognitive ability and relevant 
background knowledge. Restricting things in this way allows us to focus solely on the impact the nature of the 
unknown has on the scope for unimagined possibilities. 
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possibilities. Rather they are likely to reside in Cell 3 rather than Cell 5, having been 
imagined and considered impossible, rather than not having been imagined at all. The cases of 
the prospect of a European war or the obsolescence of a new invention illustrate a further 
class of unknown where the set of genuinely possible hypothetical values is easily deduced, 
for in these cases there are only two genuinely possible hypothetical values, namely that the 
war or obsolescence either occurs or does not. In cases of this kind, where the possible 
outcomes are binary and restricted to x and not-x, the SSP will plainly already include the full 
set of hypothetical values and nothing else. Once more, unimagined possibilities are unlikely.  
For the most part, then, Keynes’s examples impose relatively definite and easily 
understood constraints on the genuinely possible hypothetical values, either because the 
unknown relates to a relatively simple part of the world or because of the (e.g. binary) way in 
which the unknown is framed. There is then minimal scope in these examples for the kind of 
deficiencies in the SSP mentioned above and for the existence of unimagined possibilities in 
particular. The only two of Keynes’s examples which differ in this regard are those 
concerning the weather and, perhaps most clearly, the position of private wealth-holders 33 
years hence. What is special about these cases is that the unknowns relate to a complex part of 
reality—systems characterized by numerous components, their interactions and then, in the 
case of the position of private-wealth holders, viewed over an extensive time horizon—and 
that they are framed in a relatively loose and open-ended way. As a result, in determining the 
SSP an individual is faced with coming up with hypothetical values in relation to scenarios 
where key factors and their possible interactions may be difficult to identify, and perhaps 
even unknowable at the time, and where the framing of the unknown imposes far fewer 
constraints than the earlier examples. The scope for deficiencies in the SSP in these cases is 
accordingly much greater than in Keynes’s other examples, and where this, particularly with 
respect to the position of private wealth-holders more than three decades into the future, will 
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likely include the existence of unimagined possibilities. 
The absence of an explicit treatment of unimagined possibilities in the Keynes / 
Lawson account of uncertainty is perhaps not surprising in view of it starting with the 
Keynesian probability relation. For the focus then falls quite naturally on the probability of, or 
uncertainty in respect of, what Keynes calls the primary proposition—as opposed to the 
uncertainty in regard of perhaps not even being able to come up with one or more primary 
propositions that might be relevant to the problem at hand. Or, to put it in our terms, the focus 
from the outset is on imagined hypothetical values.
16
   
However, and as writers such as Rumsfeld and Taleb have become famous for 
pointing out, unimagined hypothetical values may be important too. This is evident simply 
from considering examples in which this type of uncertainty looms large, for example when 
thinking about the kind of products a major scientific advance might lead to in 10 year’s time, 
about potential improvised weapons that might be used by a terrorist organization, or about 
the long-term economic consequences for the UK of Brexit. In these kinds of scenarios 
traditional approaches to probability that presuppose knowledge of an exhaustive list of 
mutually exclusive hypothetical values (“outcomes”) simply do not apply, and accordingly, 
the approaches to decision-making on which they are based. 
Up to this point in the discussion we have focused on uncertainty regarding 
membership of the SSP, particularly in relation to unimagined hypothetical values that lie 
outside the SSP. We close this section by drawing attention to an associated, though distinct 
form of uncertainty that is central to Keynes’s account of investor behavior and liquidity 
preference. The kind of uncertainty we have in mind here flows from a lack of awareness 
                                                 
16
 The contrast between unimagined possibilities and those hypothetical values located in Cell 3 of Table 1 is 
again instructive here, for unlike the former values which are ones that have not even been contemplated, the 
latter values are ones the individual is aware of but believes that the evidence points to their impossibility.  
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about features of the world—what we will henceforth refer to as influences—that may go on 
to affect which of the hypothetical values in the SSP turns out to be the true or actual one. 
Note that uncertainty here is not about membership of the SSP, but about influences that, if 
they were known and contemplated, might enter probability judgments concerning individual 
members of the SSP. Keynes’s example of the prospect of European war nicely illustrates the 
distinction. While the binary nature of the unknown means that there is little scope for 
uncertainty in relation to the contents of the SSP in this case, the complexity of the scenario 
means there is likely to be considerable uncertainty over influences relevant to the 
determination of the probability of there being a war.  
This kind of uncertainty is closely related to what Keynes calls the weight of evidence. 
As presented in Chapter 6 of A Treatise on Probability (Keynes, 1921/1973, pp. 77-85), the 
weight of evidence is an indicator of the size in some sense, or the degree of completeness or 
spread, of evidence on which a probability judgment is based.
17
 While Keynes reveals a 
measure of ambivalence about the concept (1921/1973, p. 77, 345), he never fully rid himself 
of the idea that “the degree of completeness of the information upon which a probability is 
based does seem to be relevant … in making practical decisions” (Keynes, 1921/1973, p. 345) 
and it resurfaces in his later economic writings on investor behavior and liquidity preference 
in the General Theory (Keynes, 1936/1973) and subsequent correspondence (Runde, 1990, 
1994, 2003; O’Donnell, 1989, 1991).  
Lawson does not have much to say about the weight of evidence, but touches on the 
idea in the second part of the long footnote on uncertainty from his 1987 paper quoted above: 
Moving from [numerically indeterminate probabilities to numerically definite 
                                                 
17
 Keynes is circumspect about the extent to which weight can be measured, and his views in this regard mirror 
those he expresses about probability: “Only in a restricted class of cases can we compare the weights of two 
arguments in respect of more or less” (Keynes, 1921/1973, p. 77). 
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probabilities], Keynes talks … also of the weight of the argument increasing. For 
Keynes the weight of an argument appears to be the ‘degree of completeness of 
the information upon which a probability is based’ (Keynes, 1973, p. 345) or, 
equivalently, the ‘balance... between the absolute amounts of relevant knowledge 
and of relevant ignorance respectively’ (Keynes, 1973, p. 77). Thus as relevant 
evidence increases so too does the weight. Keynes seems to suggest that certainty 
can only be reached when weight is at its highest, and this in turn appears to 
correspond to a situation where the relevant evidence is complete (Lawson, 1987, 
p. 953, f. 2) 
We agree that low weight and Keynesian uncertainty are linked and with the idea that 
uncertainty of this sort often decreases as evidence becomes more complete (Runde, 1990). 
But we disagree with the suggestion, if it is indeed being made by Lawson here, that increases 
in weight necessarily equate to coming closer to being able to determine numerically definite 
probabilities. There are many situations in which the evidence may be highly complete but in 
which it is not possible to determine probabilities, whether this be on the basis of equal 
probabilities, a knowledge of stable frequencies, or indeed even by looking at peoples’ 
propensities to bet on different outcomes (Bewley, 1986; Gärdenfors and Sahlin, 1988; Levi, 
1974). While increases in weight may well reduce uncertainty in some sense they do not 
necessarily lead any closer to numerical probabilities. 
That aside, the ideas expressed by Keynes and Lawson on this front are comfortably 
accommodated within the framework we developed earlier in the paper. Putting the matter in 
slightly more general terms than Keynes does in A Treatise on Probability, we propose that 
the weight of evidence on which a probability judgment is based is usefully interpreted as an 
indicator of the extent to which relevant influences are contained in the evidence on which 
that judgment is based. This could be described as the weight of evidence reflecting the 
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degree of completeness of the evidence, or from a Rumsfeldian perspective, as the balance 
between influences that are knowns and those that are unknowns. That is, when weight is low 
and the evidence highly incomplete, many of the relevant influences are unknowns and so 
absent from the set of evidential propositions. Conversely when weight is high and the 
evidence relatively complete, most of the relevant influences are knowns. 
Thinking about weight of evidence in this way leads us to two closing observations. The 
first, if low weight is indeed a reflection of unknown influences, is that unknown unknowns—
influences that an individual is not even aware of being ignorant of—are likely to be 
especially pernicious in this regard. An individual who is not even aware of not knowing 
about some influence cannot begin to factor these things into their probability judgments, 
whereas, if the influences are known unknowns, they can at least begin to form a view as to 
the hypothetical values associated with those influences. Perhaps it is this that Keynes had in 
mind with his famous remark that we “simply do not know” (Keynes, 1937, pp. 213-214). In 
any event, these considerations take us back to our earlier discussion concerning the accuracy 
of the SSP, with a given unknown influence contributing most to low weight of evidence 
when the accuracy of the associated SSP is poor. 
The second observation concerns how the nature of the situation in which probability 
judgments are being made affects evidential weight. In general, the more open or complex 
such situations, particularly where the unknown concerns outcomes that lie in the distant 
future, the greater the scope for unknown influences. Keynes’s examples again serve to 
illustrate this point. Thus as we move across the spectrum from left to right in Figure 1, from 
one grouping to the next, the situations involved generally become progressively more open in 
the sense of providing increasing scope for the existence of as yet unknown influences that 
may go on to affect which of the hypothetical values in the SSP turns out to be the true one. 
And as before, this openness may also contribute to the inaccuracy of the SSP in relation to 
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known unknowns, exacerbating further the problem of low weight. In contrast, the situations 
in which it is possible to derive probabilities on an a priori basis, or to measure stable 
frequencies, situations that approximate what Lawson in his later work calls closed systems, 
are likely to be ones in which weight is that much higher.
18
  
6. Conclusion  
Most of the discussion of uncertainty in economics over the last 30 years or so, both in 
mainstream and heterodox contributions such as Tony Lawson’s, has focused on situations in 
which the objects of uncertainty can at least be imagined and stated in a way that allows them 
to be the subject of probability judgments (even if such judgments tend mostly to be 
                                                 
18
 Two referees pressed us to include more on the links between our argument and the writings of G.L.S. 
Shackle. These links would merit a paper of their own, but the broad connection as we see it is that, from his 
early writings on uncertainty onwards, Shackle (1949, 1955, 1956) was concerned with what in our language is 
the SSP being deficient in the sense of not containing all genuinely possible hypothetical values. Shackle’s non-
additive measure of potential surprise was designed to avoid these problems, i.e. to provide a measure of (dis-
)belief that could be employed even in the absence of an exhaustive set of, in his terminology, hypotheses. 
Shackle did not have much to say about the idea of non-numerical probability à la Keynes, and, although alive to 
the artificiality this entails, was generally content to use continuous (numerical) potential surprise functions in 
his iconic potential surprise diagrams (e.g., Shackle, 1979, p. 106). But he did briefly consider the weight of 
evidence, suggesting that it introduced a tension with the idea of probability as a branch of logic as outlined in 
Chapter 1 of A Treatise on Probability (Shackle, 1979, pp. 128-133). He concluded that the weight of evidence 
might “seem a little more accessible to this theme” than the notion of logical probability, suggesting that “the 
effect I would ascribe to ‘new evidence’ is that of increasing the richness of suggestion on which the chooser can 
draw in imaging rival sequels to any contemplated course of action” (Shackle, 1979, p. 132). We suggest that the 
interpretation of the weight of evidence offered above as a measure of the degree of completeness of the 
evidence would likely have been even more accessible to his theme, as it gives expression to what he called 
unknowledge in decision making under uncertainty and which formed such a consistent theme throughout his 
writings (Shackle, 1972, 1979, 1983). 
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qualitative rather than quantitative in nature). This focus has resulted in a relative neglect of 
the kind of uncertainties that flow from the existence of possibilities not even imagined and 
which therefore cannot be the subject of probability judgments.  
We have attempted to address this neglect by developing a conceptual framework that 
takes as its starting point Donald Rumsfeld’s famous distinction between known unknowns 
and unknown unknowns. The resulting framework provides a precise interpretation of 
Rumsfeld’s categories, terms that while widely employed are nonetheless under-theorized and 
prone to inconsistent usage. Building on these ideas we then put forward an exhaustive 
categorization of the different kinds of hypothetical values that might be associated with any 
unknown, and a means of describing what is contained in any individual’s subjective space of 
possibilities.  
One of the benefits of frameworks of this kind is that they provide useful vehicles for 
making connections with other accounts. We did so in the present paper, concentrating on 
Nassim Taleb’s Black Swan and Tony Lawson’s writings on Keynesian uncertainty. One of 
the payoffs is that this allowed us to distinguish six distinct varieties of uncertainty. We close 
with a brief summary of what these varieties are.  
The first corresponds to the most basic form of uncertainty dealt with in the paper, that 
relating to an individual’s ignorance about some aspect of the world:     
(1) Uncertainty concerning the existence of unknowns, whereby a person lacks knowledge 
about some feature of the world.  
This first and most fundamental form of uncertainty provides the basis for Rumsfeld’s various 
categories and our subsequent account of hypothetical values and the SSP. It is also the 
starting point for Keynes’s and Lawson’s work on uncertainty, with a particular emphasis on 
unknowns that relate to future states of the world.  
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A second kind of uncertainty, captured by Rumsfeld’s distinction between known 
unknowns and unknown unknowns, is that relating to a person’s ignorance of their own gaps 
in knowledge: 
(2) Uncertainty concerning the existence of unknown unknowns, where a person is 
unaware of some gap in knowledge.  
(2) can be thought of as a special case of (1), where the fact that something is unknown to an 
individual is viewed as a feature of the world in its own right. As we have discussed, this 
second kind of uncertainty is largely absent from the Keynes / Lawson framework. A third 
kind of uncertainty concerns the accuracy of an individual’s SSP in relation to some 
unknown: 
(3) Uncertainty concerning whether or not the membership of the SSP associated with an 
unknown is “correct”. In the case of an unknown unknown the SSP is an empty set by 
definition and so inaccurate. In the case of a known unknown one or more genuinely 
possible hypothetical values associated with that gap in knowledge may be wrongly 
excluded from the SSP, or one or more impossible hypothetical values may be 
wrongly included in the SSP. 
As with (2), neither Keynes or Lawson have much to say about this kind of uncertainty, a 
point we highlighted in the preceding section in relation to unimagined possibilities in 
particular. A fourth kind of uncertainty concerns the actual outcome associated with some 
unknown: 
(4) Uncertainty concerning which of the hypothetical values in the SSP is the true one. 
This, of course, is the standard case that writers concerned with probability have traditionally 
focused on, and which orthodox decision theory as represented by the Savage “small world” 
model is pretty much restricted to. As we have seen, many of the authors who have written on 
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this form of uncertainty in their writings differ in their views about the extent to which it can 
be expressed by numerical probabilities in different situations. This consideration leads to a 
fifth kind of uncertainty or what is sometimes called ambiguity (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986), 
namely: 
(5) Uncertainty concerning which of the hypothetical values in the SSP is the true one but 
which actors are unable or reluctant to express as numerically definite probabilities. 
This fifth case corresponds to the Keynes/Knight/Lawson formulation of uncertainty, as 
illustrated by the examples towards the right hand side of the spectrum in Figure 1. Finally, 
we highlighted a sixth form of uncertainty: 
(6) Uncertainty concerning unknown possible influences that might affect which of the 
members of the SSP will turn out to be the true one.  
We argued that (6) has affinities with Keynes’s notion of evidential weight, and is where we 
see an at least subliminal intersection between the work of Lawson and Keynes on the one 
hand and the ideas of Rumsfeld and Taleb on the other. 
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